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Participatory policies for natural resource management and poverty reduction have 
been implemented worldwide. Inclusive participation and empowerment potentially 
enhances intrinsic motivation to conserve resources. However, whether participation 
in activities for poverty reduction enhances intrinsic motivation for resource 
conservation is unknown. We evaluate the impact of participation, in activities to 
develop sustainable livelihoods, on the intrinsic motivation of forest-dwelling 
community members to conserve forest commons. As a component of Brazil’s Bolsa 
Floresta programme, these activities involve decision-making, skills training and 
knowledge exchange related to sustainable livelihoods. Using a framed common-pool 
resource game with 160 community members in Amazonas State, we measure 
intrinsic motivation via members’ extent of cooperation to conserve trees. We obtain 
an estimate of impact by exploiting a natural experiment, whereby the treatment 
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group was offered the choice to participate in activities to develop sustainable 
livelihoods. We find that participation crowds in cooperative behaviour and hence, 
intrinsic motivation to conserve forest commons. This result suggests that enabling 
participation and empowering community members in the development of sustainable 
livelihoods has a positive effect on conservation behaviour. Our results have critical 
implications for participatory policies with dual environment-development goals in 
settings where policy recipients are marginalised.  	
Participatory policies to conserve common-pool resources, such as forests, engage and 
transfer powers to local stakeholders in natural resource management [1, 2]. Participation 
can be characterised by the extent and timing of stakeholder involvement [2-4]. A shift to 
more inclusive participation, i.e. extending it to the full decision-making process, potentially 
empowers stakeholders who were previously restricted in their access to and use of 
resources. By giving stakeholders the knowledge, confidence, means, or ability to make 
decisions in natural resource management, greater empowerment has been shown to be 
empirically associated with more collective action in the commons, e.g. monitoring of 
resource use [5]. In turn, more collective action is often a key determinant of improved 
resource conservation outcomes [e.g. 5, 6]. 
Empowerment can change stakeholder behaviour when stakeholders become intrinsically 
motivated, i.e. gaining personal fulfilment or satisfaction [7, 8]. Thus, a change in behaviour, 
such as an increased willingness to engage in collective action and cooperate in the 
commons, could be driven by an enhanced intrinsic motivation to conserve resources. This 
behavioural change is critical in the context of conservation policy’s role in either 
strengthening (‘crowding in’) or weakening (‘crowding out’) stakeholders’ intrinsic motivations 
to conserve resources [9, 10]. So-called ‘motivation crowding’ effects are often estimated via 
the use of economic games that measure cooperation levels in resource settings, including 
the behavioural responses of players to hypothetical treatments in conservation policy [11]. 
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However, the evidence as to whether such treatments, involving incentives or disincentives, 
have generated motivation crowding effects remains inconclusive [e.g. 12-15].  
Participatory conservation policies in poorer countries often have a strong focus on reducing 
poverty too. It is unclear whether inclusive participation in poverty-reduction activities have a 
positive effect on the intrinsic motivation to conserve resources. Becoming empowered 
implies more opportunities for decision-making, learning new skills or gaining knowledge 
related to the development of new livelihoods thus giving stakeholders more control over 
their labour - a key asset of the rural poor. This surely motivates stakeholders but if the new 
livelihoods are not directly tied to resource use, it is unclear whether they would influence 
intrinsic motivation to conserve resources. A positive impact is perhaps more likely when 
livelihoods are tied to resource use, even indirectly, e.g. eco-tourism, and where a culture of 
environmental sustainability is encouraged [16]. 
We explore this idea in Brazil’s forest conservation and poverty reduction programme Bolsa 
Floresta (PBF), implemented by Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS, Amazon 
Sustainable Foundation) [17]. In 2018, almost 40,000 people in 581 communities, claiming 
11 million hectares of forest in Amazonas State, were enrolled in PBF. Amazonas remains 
heavily forested and has historically low rates of deforestation. Yet, FAS is concerned about 
future deforestation risk, particularly close to the state capital, Manaus, and has no 
monitoring or enforcement capacity at the commons scale. The onus is thus on community 
members enrolled in PBF to monitor resource use and enforce rules at this scale.  
Enacted by the State of Amazonas in 2007, PBF comprises four components. The first is 
Family, a monthly household-level cash payment (Supplementary Information, Section A). 
Next, Association supports community leaders in forest co-management, followed by 
Income, in which FAS offers community members a platform for creating sustainable 




To integrate these components, FAS implements a ‘social contract’ to empower community 
members who, prior to PBF, were often marginalised through the implementation of top-
down conservation policies that prohibited resource-intensive activities, and the non-
provision of public services such as healthcare. The social contract is implemented through 
the intensive engagement of FAS personnel, funds and outreach in enrolled communities. 
Community members enrolled in PBF are offered greater control over resource use as well 
as tools and opportunities that facilitate sustainability in resource management and 
livelihoods. Tools and opportunities are made available by FAS via a participatory approach 
concentrated in the Income component. This approach is applied to workshops held at the 
community scale.  
Workshops are the main vehicle for developing livelihoods, such as ecotourism and 
handicrafts, in the expectation of these replacing more resource-intensive livelihoods and 
hence, potentially contributing to sustainability [18, 19]. Open to all community members, 
including leaders, the role of FAS in workshops is to help members develop business plans, 
learn new skills and obtain knowledge related to livelihoods. As well as training, workshops 
provide a forum for knowledge exchange among community members; outside the 
workshops, there is an emphasis on the ‘multiplication of knowledge’, in which trained 
community members pass on their skills and knowledge to other members of their 
communities (Supplementary Information, Section A). 
Participation in workshops is voluntary and community members decide which livelihoods to 
implement. To varying degrees, participation in workshops (and the corresponding 
livelihoods chosen) tends to be collaborative. Individual participation incurs private costs, 
such as an opportunity cost of time spent in workshops and the provision of in-kind inputs, 
e.g. labour. Livelihoods proposed by community members are funded by FAS, e.g. for 
equipment and training. Expected financial benefits are uncertain, depending on whether 
community members succeed in creating livelihoods. 	
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Participants also benefit from new decision-making opportunities (e.g., deciding which 
handicrafts to produce), learning new skills (e.g. to produce new handicraft lines) and 
gaining new knowledge (e.g. about the market for handicrafts). These non-pecuniary 
benefits could motivate conservation behaviour, yet as they are not contingent on such 
behaviour, i.e. are generated irrespective of conservation behaviour, motivational crowding 
occurs when participants are intrinsically motivated in their use of forest resources [20, 21].  
To test whether the participatory approach implemented by FAS crowds in participants’ 
intrinsic motivation in their use of forests, we measure the extent to which they cooperate in 
a common-pool resource (CPR) game (Methods). We adopt ‘extent of cooperation’ as our 
outcome measure based on previous work (e.g., exposure to war [22] and property rights 
reform [23]). Framed in terms of timber extraction, the greater the extent of cooperation, the 
lower the rate of tree extraction and the more trees conserved.  
A precondition for implementing PBF is that communities’ territorial claims and resource use 
rights must first be formalised via the establishment of a mixed-use reserve, such as a 
Reserva de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (RDS, Sustainable Development Reserve). 
Reserves comprise multiple communities, each claiming a forest commons in exchange for 
agreeing to restrictions on resource-intensive activities, e.g. logging. We exploit exogenous 
variation in the timing of reserve formation to generate treatment and control groups 
(Methods). Opportunities to participate in the Income component were only available in the 
treatment group. To account for the possibility that some community members in the 
treatment group might choose not to participate, we analyse our data within an intention-to-
treat (ITT) framework that includes both participants and non-participants in the treatment 
group.  
Results 
We conducted a CPR game and household survey in a sample of community members from 
two reserves (Fig. 1, Methods). Located on opposite sides of the Rio Negro (Black River), 
10-20 km apart, the reserves are broadly similar (Supplementary Table I, Supplementary 
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Fig. 1, Supplementary Information, Section A). Our treatment group, RDS Rio Negro, was 
established in 2008 and has been enrolled in all four components of PBF since 2009. 
Created in 2014, our control group, RDS Puranga Conquista, was only enrolled in the Family 
component. As opportunities to participate in the Income component were made 
simultaneously across communities in the treatment group, our first ITT effect is estimated 
from our natural experiment at the reserve scale. 
Our second ITT effect is estimated at the community scale, the scale at which sustainable 
livelihoods in the Income component were developed. Four communities in the treatment 
group were matched with three communities in the control group (Methods, Supplementary 
Table 2). A range of livelihoods has been implemented in the treated communities, from 
tourist accommodation to sport fishing (Table 1). A majority were either in the early or 
intermediate stage of development. Many community members reportedly had yet to receive 
tangible, private benefits from these livelihoods. 
As community members initiated and attended workshops to develop sustainable 
livelihoods, we also estimate a treatment effect at the individual scale, based on the rate of 
participation in workshops. Workshops take place at all stages in the development of most if 
not all livelihoods, and play an instrumental role in activities and processes that take place 
outside the workshops (Supplementary Information, Section A). As such activities and 
processes are a function of workshop participation, the participation rate could proxy for 
‘intensity’ of participation in the Income component.  
The average participation rate in the treatment group, containing 100 community members, 
is almost two workshops per person. In the control group, with 60 members, it is one 
workshop per person despite there being no such workshops organised in these 
communities (Supplementary Table 3, Supplementary Fig. 2), an anomaly we address in 
Methods. Regarding attrition, 45 community members in the treatment group stated that they 
did not participate in any Income workshops. Community members who were already 
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enrolled in the Family component, including non-participants in the treatment group, were 
recruited to play six rounds of our CPR game. 
In every round, average tree extraction rates per player are higher in the control group 
than in the treatment group. Fig. 2 shows the average extraction rates per player in each 
round, treatment group vs control group (Supplementary Fig. 3 shows rates per player by 
community). Players often chose similar extraction rates across rounds (Supplementary 
Table 4). Average rates are relatively low, because, in every round, most players opted to 
extract no trees at all (Supplementary Fig. 4). To handle large numbers of observed zeros, 
we apply a hurdle model [24], which combines a selection model with an outcome model, to 
our data (Methods).  
Reserve- and community-level ITT effects are associated with a higher likelihood of 
zero tree extraction. The reserve ITT effect is estimated with a dichotomous dummy 
variable (‘Reserve’) using round one data only. In column 1 of Table 2, it has a negative and 
positive coefficient in the ‘Select’ and ‘Outcome’ panels, respectively. Estimating a reserve 
ITT effect using all rounds of data generates a similar result (Supplementary Table 5). As 
Select denotes the decision of whether to extract zero or a positive number of trees, this 
result implies that the reserve ITT effect is significantly associated with a higher likelihood of 
choosing zero extraction (p=0.031). By contrast, it has an insignificant effect in the Outcome 
panel, for the decision of how many trees to extract for players extracting a positive number 
of trees.  
A community-level ITT effect is estimated using all rounds of data and dichotomous dummy 
variables for each of the four treated communities. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the 
coefficient on these variables is negative for three communities (4, 5 and 7) in both the 
Select and Outcome panels, and statistically significant for two (4 and 7) in the Select panel 
(p<0.001). Thus, the treatment is significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of choosing 
a zero extraction rate in two of the four treated communities. Note that as Income workshops 
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were initiated according to the demands of community members, unobserved confounders 
potentially influence the community ITT effects. 
Participation in Income workshops is associated with a higher likelihood of a player 
choosing zero tree extraction. An individual treatment effect is first estimated using a 
dichotomous dummy variable, ‘Individual (0,1)’, which is coded ‘1’ if one or more workshops 
were attended. In column 2 of Table 2, this variable has a negative yet insignificant 
association with extraction rates in both panels. A second individual effect is estimated using 
workshop participation rate, ‘Individual (#)’. In column 3 of Table 2, a higher rate is 
significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of zero extraction (p=0.049). From columns 3-
5 in Table 2, the marginal effect of participation ranges from -0.38 to -0.56. Thus, attendance 
at one additional workshop is associated with half-a-tree less extracted in the game. 
We include the reserve ITT variable alongside the individual treatment variables in columns 
2-4 of Table 2. The inclusion of either individual variable reduces the size of the coefficient 
on the reserve variable and its statistical significance in the Select panel (compare column 1 
to columns 2 and 3, in Table 2). This implies that part of the reserve effect comes from the 
individual effect. As the reserve variable may be picking up effects from the other 
components of PBF (Methods), it also acts as a control when estimating the individual effect. 
If participation is correlated with unobserved factors that are also correlated with extraction 
rates, e.g. kinship ties, then our individual treatment effect could be biased. We add further 
pre-treatment controls in column 4 of Table 2. The coefficient on Individual (#) remains 
stable, although its statistical significance is reduced (from p=0.049 in column 3 to p=0.060 
in column 4, Table 2). We next add post-treatment controls (column 5, Table 2), which are 
likely to be endogenous: as expected, the coefficient on Individual (#) is larger and gains 
statistical significance (compare columns 4 and 5 in Table 2). The effect of Individual (#) on 
extraction rates is robust to the addition of all controls (Supplementary Table 6 and 7).  
A significant individual treatment effect first emerges when participants attend three 
or more workshops. Column 2 of Table 3 includes a pair of participation rate dummy 
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variables. First, ‘Individual (1-2)’ is for participants who attended a total of one or two 
workshops; in the Select panel, it is positively correlated with extraction rates. Second, 
‘Individual (3-15)’ is for participants who attended three or more workshops; it is negatively 
correlated with extraction rates and indicates the threshold over which a significant negative 
effect first emerges in the Select panel (p=0.060). Supplementary Table 8 shows results 
from testing alternative pairs of dummies. 
If a higher participation rate motivates higher levels of cooperation which, in turn, motivates 
further participation in workshops then there is potential for reverse causality (Methods). We 
use the number of adults in the household as an instrument for Individual (#). Results 
(Supplementary Table 9) are consistent with those in Table 2. However, our instrument is 
relatively weak, which increases the likelihood of finite sample bias when conducting 
instrumental variable analysis in a small sample [25]. Other empirical issues, and our 
strategies to address these, are discussed in Methods. Results (Supplementary Table 10-14, 
Supplementary Information, Section B) are in line with Table 2. 
Discussion 
Our results contribute to knowledge and understanding of how conservation policies 
influence intrinsic motivations of local stakeholders in their use of natural resources. In 
particular, the behavioural response of marginalised stakeholders to conservation policies 
when there is an additional focus on poverty reduction and when policy implementation 
involves the application of a participatory approach with a goal of stakeholder empowerment. 
This type of policy can be characterised as a hybrid, which in the case of PBF combines 
aspects of participatory governance, payments for ecosystem services and the development 
of alternative livelihoods.  
Among the beneficiaries of PBF, we observed relatively low tree extraction rates in both the 
treatment and control groups, certainly lower than comparable studies, e.g. [26]. Mean 
extraction rates in round one were 22% and 16% of the Nash equilibrium extraction rate (20 
trees) in our control and treatment groups, respectively. These rates indicate high levels of 
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cooperation and thus high levels of intrinsic motivation to conserve forest commons. The fact 
that these rates are high in both groups possibly reflects the intensive engagement of the 
policy manager, FAS, in our study area and the influence of two bottom-up conservation 
policies – the mixed-use reserves and PBF – over a number of years. While we observed 
relatively strong conservation behaviours and attitudes among the beneficiaries of PBF, 
including those only enrolled in the Family component, we note that other, unobserved 
factors may also play a role in generating these high cooperation levels, e.g. high levels of 
pre-existing trust among community members. 	
Different types of benefit are generated by the components of PBF. In the Income 
component, with its focus on developing sustainable livelihoods, participant empowerment is 
characterised as a non-pecuniary benefit of participation. The participatory development of 
livelihoods (costing 35% of PBF funds) has the potential to be a cost-effective and 
sustainable way of increasing conservation behaviour relative to the Family cash transfer, 
which absorbs half of all funds invested in PBF [14, 18, 19].	
At different treatment scales, the participatory approach is associated with higher levels of 
cooperation and hence, crowding in of intrinsic motivation to conserve forest commons. The 
approach thus had a positive effect despite mixed success in creating livelihoods. This has 
important implications for other, similar policies implemented in settings where local people 
are marginalised. 	
Conceived as a social contract, PBF seems to have generated a normative sign of a 
desirable societal action among policy beneficiaries [27]. In particular, the process of 
creating sustainable livelihoods improved participants’ knowledge and understanding of the 
potential conservation benefits generated by these livelihoods. This process connected 
participants not only to the wider economy but also to society, often for the first time. Thus, 
the managers of other, similar policies could attempt to communicate – indeed sell – the 
broader environmental implications, and not just the private benefits of participation in 
activities to develop sustainable livelihoods. 	
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Per similar policies in other settings, PBF has dual environment-development objectives that 
need the inclusive participation of community members for meeting both objectives in the 
long-run. Given an attrition rate of almost 50%, future research could examine why non-
participants in our treatment group chose not to participate. There may be barriers to 
participation, including those related to intra-community inequalities. Wealth or asset 
inequality could be exacerbated if participation mostly benefits those who are already 
relatively wealthy [28, 29]. 	
Our measure of forest conservation behaviour is derived from game outcomes. Although 
game outcomes generate a useful signal about members’ conservation behaviour and 
hence, possible sources of deforestation risk, there remains a question of whether players 
would behave similarly in a real forest setting. If participation is effective in changing social 
norms regarding cooperation in the commons over the longer-term then game outcomes 
could proxy for forest outcomes. To test this idea, we would need to re-run the game with the 
same sample of community members and collect forest commons data in our study setting. 
Further research could also examine the mechanism by which empowerment and inclusive 
participation influences intrinsic motivation to conserve the commons. Despite lacking 
precise data on the collaborative processes inherent in the development of livelihoods, we 
observed that the extent of collaboration varied depending on the livelihood chosen by 
community members. Where collaboration is critical for livelihood development, there is 
likely to be a building of trust, which may help motivate cooperation [30, 31].  
Collaboration typically involves communication. Participants in the Income component 
played the CPR game without communicating, indeed without knowing who else was in their 
groups, which often included non-participants too. A communication treatment combined 
with data on collaborative processes could explore whether and how exposure to these 
processes translates into solving the commons dilemma. By not allowing communication, 
our CPR game might have prevented those free-riders who may have simply misunderstood 
the dilemma from learning how it could be solved. Communication would allow for learning, 
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giving cooperative players an opportunity to persuade players extracting trees to cooperate 
thus potentially increasing collective benefits [14, 32, 33]. Other reasons for non-cooperation 
and players’ strategies to address these could also be explored in a communication 
treatment. 
Another possible mechanism concerns how empowerment relates to the psychological 
mechanisms underlying motivation crowding [10, 20, 21]. Giving people more control over 
their labour via opportunities for decision-making, learning skills and gaining knowledge 
potentially enhances participants’ feelings of autonomy. The central role of sustainability in 
many of the livelihoods suggests that the relevant psychological triggers were present for 
motivating conservation behaviour. Additional research is needed, however, to determine 
whether autonomy, or other psychological moderators, played a role in our setting.  
In our setting, profitable, alternative uses of forest land are limited by the nutrient-poor soils 
and waters of the Rio Negro. Yet, the influence of policies like PBF on cooperative behaviour 
should be similar in other settings, in Brazil and elsewhere, where alternative uses of forest 
land are more profitable. In such settings, there is likely to be a higher risk of external threats 
to forest commons due to, e.g. illegal logging. Where governments struggle to enforce forest 
laws and counter external threats, e.g. due a lack of capacity, greater intrinsic motivation to 
conserve forests could motivate communities to organize in a manner that enables them to 
resist external threats. Programmes similar to PBF could, if they foster greater cooperation 
within communities, directly or indirectly support actions such as building solidarity with other 
marginalized groups and forming cooperatives to negotiate better prices for products that 
have been sustainably produced. 
Methods 
Natural experiment and common-pool resource game. The Bolsa Floresta programme 
(PBF) is only implemented in communities located in Amazonas State after a mixed-use 
reserve (e.g. RDS) has been established, and communities’ territorial claims and forest use 
rights have been formalised. We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of reserve 
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formation to generate treatment and control groups. Our treatment is the opportunity 
extended to community members to participate in the Income component, where the 
participatory approach developed by FAS is concentrated. Community members were 
sampled from communities in two reserves (Fig. 1).  
Our treatment group was RDS Rio Negro. Created in 2008, it has since 2009 been enrolled 
in all four components of PBF. Our control group, RDS Puranga Conquista was created 
later, in 2014, due to being previously designated a strict protected area by the government 
of Amazonas State, in 1995. Territorial conflicts involving communities, State and Federal 
agencies slowed the process of establishing RDS Puranga Conquista [34]. This provides a 
plausibly exogenous means by which our treatment and control groups were assigned. Only 
the Family component had been implemented in the control group. Thus, all sampled 
community members, in both our treatment and control groups, were receiving the Family 
cash transfer but only members in the former were offered opportunities to initiate and attend 
Income workshops, from 2009 onwards. 
In principle, RDS Puranga Conquista acts as a kind of counterfactual, i.e. allowing us to 
measure cooperation levels in the absence of opportunities to initiate and attend Income 
workshops in RDS Rio Negro. This rests on the assumption that our treatment and control 
groups are similar. On the basis of a limited set of observable characteristics, such as size, 
deforestation rates, number of communities and distance to market, they can be considered 
broadly similar (Supplementary Fig. 1, Supplementary Information, Section A). Also, on the 
basis of the earliest household data collected (in 2015) sufficient to allow for a comparison 
(Supplementary Table 1), average incomes aside, there seems to be few substantial 
differences between the groups.  
We matched communities across the treatment and control groups to ensure that our post-
matching treatment and control groups were as similar to one another as possible. Matching 
was undertaken using a community-level dataset for a limited set of variables: ethnicity, main 
livelihood activities, access to a public boat service, presence of a primary school, presence 
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of a Conservation Centre and population. These data were gathered by FAS for all 
communities located in the treatment and control groups (Supplementary Table 2). To 
mitigate post-treatment bias, we use data gathered in 2009, i.e. the year when the Income 
component was made available to communities in the treatment group.  
Pre-matching, we made a number of observations. First, all 17 communities in the treatment 
group were defined as non-indigenous (cabocla). Additional to concerns about differences 
between indigenous and non-indigenous groups (Supplementary Information, Section B), the 
fact that none of the treated communities were defined as indigenous implied excluding 
those that were – five in total – from the control group. Second, all treated communities 
extracted timber as a main economic activity. This was important for the framing of the CPR 
game (see below). We thus excluded communities in the control group that did not extract 
timber. Third, as all treated communities had access to a public boat service (recreio), which 
proxied for market access, we excluded communities in the control group that did not have 
access to a boat service. This left three communities in the post-matching control group, 
each of which had its own primary school. A single Conservation Centre, built and run by 
FAS, is present in one community in each of the control and treatment groups. In the post-
matching sample, both of these communities were excluded. 
Turning to the treatment group, we first excluded communities that did not have their own 
school, which reduced the group to 10 communities. We then used the population data to 
finalise the post-matching treatment group. The three communities in the post-matching 
control group (Pagodão, VL Nova do Chita and Santa Maria) had populations that ranged 
from 83 to 120 people. By contrast, the 10 remaining treated communities had a wider 
range: 31-224. We individually matched each of the three communities in the control group 
to treated communities. This was undertaken by calculating the differences in populations 
between communities across the two groups before selecting the treated community that 
minimised the difference for each community in the control group, thus generating three 
communities in the post-matching treatment group (Camará, Saracá and 15 de Setembro). 
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At the start of the fieldwork, one more community was added to the treatment group, N. S. 
Perpétuo Socorro (Supplementary Information, Section B), on the basis of minimising the 
difference between the population of this community and the average population of the three 
communities in the post-matching control group.  
Insufficient data existed for precise ex ante matching of individuals across the treatment and 
control groups, although registers of community members enrolled in the Family component 
enabled us to sample these members only. That all players were receiving the monthly 
Family cash transfer allowed us first, to establish a baseline level of conservation behaviour 
in the sample and second, made it easier for players to understand the idea of collective 
benefits being generated in a common-pool resource (CPR) game.   
Effective commons-level monitoring and enforcement requires collective action to share 
monitoring costs and prevent free-riding on the benefits of conservation [30, 31]. The extent 
to which community members already cooperate in the commons, and the extent to which 
this is crowded-in due to participation in the Income component, is evaluated by application 
of a CPR game. Framed in terms of tree extraction, players individually decided how many 
trees to extract and how many to leave standing. Trees extracted generated a private payoff; 
trees left standing generated collective benefits shared equally among the players assigned 
to a particular group (see below). The structure of game payoffs was such that rational, 
selfish players had an incentive to extract as many trees as possible. Higher individual 
payoffs accrued when there were sufficient collective benefits of a standing forest to share, 
i.e. when more players left more trees standing. This can occur if, over the course of multiple 
rounds, strategic behaviour emerges among players, e.g., conditional cooperation [35-37].  
Experimental and household survey data were collected from all seven communities, in July 
2018. In each community, we organised one CPR game played over six rounds. Players 
were anonymously and randomly assigned to a group of four players. At no point before, 
during or after the game did players know the identity of the other players in their groups. No 
communication was allowed during or between rounds. In every round, 80 trees were 
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available in each group. Players extracted 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 trees, with the remainder shared 
among the group equally: if a player extracted 20 trees, she received BRL 4.00 plus a 
quarter share of the value of trees remaining; if she extracted no trees, she received BRL 
1.60 plus a quarter share of the value of trees remaining (Supplementary Information, 
Section B).  
After the game, players were individually surveyed, including demographic data, livelihoods 
and social networks. Questions on participation were conveyed to all players in both the 
control and treatment groups. These questions elicited responses about meetings, different 
types of workshop and community organisations, both those related and unrelated to PBF. 
Workshops are common practice in PBF, which may have led to misunderstandings over the 
participation questions in the household survey, e.g. when community members join PBF, 
they attend two workshops where details of the Income component are presented. This 
could explain why some survey respondents in the control group stated positive rates of 
participation in Income workshops. We also conducted 26 in-depth elite interviews 
(Supplementary Information, Section D). In all aspects of our research, we complied with the 
relevant regulations (e.g. prior authorisation from the environmental agency responsible for 
the reserves), obtained informed consent from all research participants and confirm that the 
study complied with the Research Ethics Policy and Procedure, as laid down by the 
Research Ethics Committee of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). 
Analytical methods. Our empirical analysis evaluates the impact of the participatory 
approach developed by FAS, the treatment, on cooperation in the commons. As participation 
in the Income component is voluntary, our treatment may suffer from attrition if some 
community members in the treatment group opted not to participate. If this attrition is non-
random then it could bias estimates of our treatment on cooperation because it would 
capture the effect of a self-selected group. This bias occurs if non-participants are 




An intention-to-treat (ITT) framework is adopted to test for evidence of a treatment effect, i.e. 
of the participatory approach, by including in the empirical analysis all participants and non-
participants in the treatment group [38]. The reserve-level ITT effect is broad in that it could, 
in theory, be picking up the effects of Association, Income and Social on cooperation. The 
Association component involves the participation of community leaders in institution building 
at reserve level while the Social component involves engagement with, rather than the 
participation of, community members. Public services via the Social component are provided 
unconditionally to all community members. The community-level ITT effect may pick up on 
variation in the initiation and implementation of workshops across treated communities. How 
workshops are initiated and implemented depends on the needs and demands of community 
members. Thus, unobserved confounders could potentially bias our community ITT effects. 
The individual treatment effect also suffers from potential endogeneity problems, which we 
discuss below.  
Our outcome variable is the number of trees extracted in round r by individual i in the CPR 
game. This is a bounded dependent variable (0, 20) and because we observed many zeros, 
we adopted a hurdle model [24], a general form of a selection model. Specifically, the hurdle 
model combines a selection model that determines boundary points of the dependent 
variable with an outcome model that determines its non-bounded values. It simultaneously 
allows for a decision of whether to extract zero or a greater than zero number of trees and if 
greater than zero, the number of trees to extract. The model is estimated using maximum 
likelihood. Formally, for individual 𝑖 the tree extraction decision in round r is specified as:  
 𝑦#$% = 𝛾%𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡#(.,0) + 𝜖#, decision: whether or not to extract trees 
 𝑦#$4 = 𝛽%𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡#(.,0) + 𝑣#, decision: how many trees to extract  





where: 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡#(.,0) is the treatment variable (individual i, community c, reserve R), which, 
depending on the model estimated, is either a dichotomous dummy variable (‘Reserve’, 
‘Individual (0,1)’), a pair of dichotomous dummy variables (‘Individual (0-x)’, ‘Individual 
((x+1)-15)’), a set of four dichotomous dummy variables (‘Community 4’, ‘Community 5’, 
‘Community 6’, ‘Community 7’) or a continuous variable (‘Individual (#)’); 𝜖# is a standard 
normal error term; and, 𝑣#is an error term, which has a truncated normal distribution with 
lower truncation point −𝑥#𝛽. Standard errors are clustered at group level (40 clusters in 
total). This allows for intragroup correlation when using all rounds of data, i.e. due to the 
potential for strategic behaviour, such as reciprocity, which could influence rates in 
subsequent rounds.  
The coefficients on 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡#(.,0) are given by 𝛾% and 𝛽%. To support our hypothesis that 
participation crowds in intrinsic motivation to conserve forest commons, these coefficients 
would need to be negative. A negative 𝛾% (𝛽%) is thus associated with a higher likelihood of 
zero extraction (a lower extraction rate). 
All of our treatment effects are separately estimated using round one extraction data (Table 
2) and all rounds of data (Supplementary Table 5), except for the community-level treatment 
effects and the pairs of participation rate dummy variables. These two treatment effects are 
only estimated using all rounds of data (Table 3) due to multicollinearity when using round 
one data only. 
Sources of bias and robustness checks. The following checks are applied to our 
individual treatment effect, specifically the participation rate variable. All results are shown in 
the Supplementary Information (Section B and Supplementary Table 9-14). 
Omitted variables. There are likely to be factors that are correlated with individual 
participation and extent of cooperation, which if not included in the analysis could lead to 
omitted variable bias. We add two sets of controls, pre-treatment and post-treatment. The 
former is unlikely to be affected by the treatment while the latter could be affected by the 
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treatment and hence, potentially endogenous. There are two pre-treatment controls, age and 
gender, and six post-treatment controls, beginning with another demographic variable, level 
of education. This acts as a proxy for the player’s opportunity cost of time in Income 
workshops, with a higher education level raising this cost.  
Next, we add three variables to control for cooperative behaviour. First, a kinship index that 
indicates the strength of kinship ties based on social network questions in the household 
survey. Players named the three people they were closest to in their community, indicated 
who they were (e.g. family), and how often they interacted. Second, a variable that indicates 
whether the player belonged to a community organisation prior to the formation of the 
reserve. Third, a variable that controls for whether the player is in the ‘Leadership Directory’, 
i.e. was a community leader in the past or is one in the present, and hence, may have 
participated in the Association component. 
Finally, we add two policy variables that might also be associated with higher levels of 
cooperative behaviour. First, whether players (they or members of their household) had 
received any tangible benefits from Income activities. Second, the number of months a 
household was enrolled in the Family component, which controls for the duration of 
exposure to cash payments, and the conservation approach and ethos of FAS (social 
desirability bias). It also controls for community residency thus minimising the potential for 
bias due to movements between the control and treatment groups (‘leakage’).  
In models using all rounds of data, we add the control ‘Round’, a dummy for the game round 
that acts as a time fixed effect, controlling for common learning trends across players.  
Reverse causality. We instrument for the participation rate variable using the number of 
adults in the household in an IV probit model (Supplementary Table 9): the more adults in a 
household, the larger the household labour supply and the lower the opportunity cost of time 
spent in the Income workshops (i.e. the lower the marginal product of labour) and hence, the 
higher the likelihood of participation. If, however, households with more (fewer) adults are 
more cooperative than households with fewer (more) adults then this variable will be 
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correlated with the error term and the exclusion restriction will not be satisfied. On the basis 
of local knowledge, however, the pattern is unclear. Given labour-intensive livelihoods, 
smaller households might depend more on community support than larger ones, e.g. for help 
with childcare, but an individual’s level of cooperation could plausibly be the same in both 
cases.  
In the absence of a formal test, the inclusion of ‘Kinship index’, one of the post-treatment 
controls, in the first stage of the IV probit could help fulfil the exclusion restriction as a higher 
value indicates close and regular interaction with adult family members. From column 4 in 
Supplementary Table 6, stronger kinship ties are associated with a higher likelihood of zero 
extraction (p=0.044), and reduce the size of the coefficient on Individual (#) as well as its 
statistical significance (compare columns 3 and 4 in Supplementary Table 6).  
Self-selection into the CPR game. Not everyone we invited to play in the CPR game in the 
treatment group volunteered to play (Supplementary Table 10). Community members 
participating in the Income component might be more likely to attend the CPR games than 
those in the control group. Using the Family registers and socio-economic data collected in a 
FAS survey undertaken in 2015, we test for differences in observable characteristics 
between volunteers and non-volunteers in the treatment group (Supplementary Table 11). 
Robustness checks. Five are undertaken (Supplementary Table 12 and 13). First, non-
participants from the treatment group are grouped as observations in the control group. Also, 
some community members from the control group stated non-zero rates of participation in 
Income workshops and are grouped as observations in the treatment group. All of these 
observations are dropped. Second, we test whether results for the participation rate 
individual treatment effect are driven by outliers by log transforming this variable and adding 
a Battese correction on zeros [39]. Third, a placebo test is undertaken by replacing the 
participation rate variable with the participation rate in Conservation Centre workshops (also 
run by FAS and supposedly mandatory). Fourth, we restrict our sample to the six 
communities in the original post-matching treatment and control groups. Fifth, possible social 
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desirability bias is addressed by including the duration that a household has been receiving 
the fishing allowance (Seguro Pesca), which, apart from PBF, is the only other government- 
or NGO-enacted environment-related programme that has a relatively high rate of 
penetration in the study area. 
Alternative specifications. We apply four (Supplementary Table 14): two count data models 
that can handle large numbers of zeros (zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model, zero-
inflated Poisson (ZIP) model); a standard OLS model that uses the average individual 
extraction rate across all six rounds of data as a dependent variable; and, after converting all 
of our non-zero observations to ones, a panel probit with individual-level random effects.  
Data Availability 
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 
upon request.  
References 
1. Engel, S., Palmer, C. & Pfaff, A. On the endogeneity of resource comanagement: 
theory and evidence from Indonesia. Land Econ. 89, 308-329 (2013). 
2. Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. Localizing Developing: Does Participation Work? (World 
Bank, Washington, D.C., 2013). 
3. Arnstein, S. R. A ladder of citizen participation. J. Am. Inst. Planners 35, 216-224 
(1969). 
4. Reed, M. S. Stakeholder participation for environmental management: a literature 
review. Biol. Conserv. 141, 2417-2431 (2008). 
5. Coleman, E. A., & Fleischman, F. D. Comparing forest decentralization and local 
institutional change in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda. World Dev. 40, 836-849 
(2012). 
6. Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. Conditional cooperation and costly monitoring 
explain success in forest commons management. Science 330, 961-965 (2010). 
22	
	
7. Spreitzer, G. M. Individual empowerment in the workplace: Dimensions, 
measurement, validation. Acad. Man. J. 38, 1442–1465 (1995). 
8. Zhang, X., & Bartol, K. M. Linking empowering leadership and employee creativity: 
The influence of psychological empowerment, intrinsic motivation, and creative 
process engagement. Acad. Man. J. 53, 108-128 (2010). 
9. Rode, J., Gómez-Baggethun, & Krause, T. Motivation crowding by economic 
incentives in conservation policy: A review of the empirical evidence. Ecol. Econ. 
117, 270-282 (2015).  
10. Ezzine-de-Blas, Corbera, E., & Lepeyre, R. Payments for environmental services and 
motivational crowding: towards a conceptual framework. Ecol. Econ. 156, 434-443 
(2019). 
11. Cárdenas, J. C. Human behaviour and the use of experiments to understand the 
agricultural, resource, and environmental challenges of the XXI century. Ag. Econ. 
47, supplement 61-71 (2016). 
12. Cárdenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. Local environmental control and 
institutional crowding-out. World Dev. 28, 1719-1733 (2000). 
13. Vollan, B. Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field 
experiments in southern Africa. Ecol. Econ. 67, 560-573 (2008). 
14. Andersson, K. P., et al. Experimental evidence on payments for forest commons 
conservation. Nat. Sustain. 1, 128-135 (2018). 
15. Kaczan, D. J., Swallow, B. M., & Adamowicz, W. L. Forest conservation policy and 
motivational crowding: Experimental evidence from Tanzania’, Ecol. Econ. 156, 444-
453 (2018). 
16. Dedeurwaerdere, T. J. et al. Combining internal and external motivations in multi-
actor governance arrangements for biodiversity and ecosystem services.  Environ. 
Sci. Policy 58, 1-10 (2016). 
23	
	
17. Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS) (2018) Relatório de Atividades 2018, FAS, 
Amazonas, Brazil. Downloaded 1st May 2019: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sqwdTWI4KXMpLfk36p_ADzC2Hpu1kkOW/view	
18. Ferraro, P., & Simpson, D. The cost-effectiveness of conservation payments. Land 
Econ. 78, 339-353 (2002). 
19. Groom, B., & Palmer, C. Cost-effective provision of environmental services: the role 
of relaxing market constraints. Env. Dev. Econ. 15, 219-240 (2010). 
20. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. A motivational approach to self: integration in personality’, 
chapter 2 in: Dienstbier, R (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Perspectives 
on Motivation 38, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, pp.237-288 (1991). 
21. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. Am. Psychol. 55, 68-78 (2000). 
22. Bauer, M., et al. Can war foster cooperation? J. Econ. Perspect. 30, 249-74 (2016). 
23. Fabbri, M. How Institutions Shape Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Large-
scale Property Rights Reform Implemented as Randomized Control-trial. mimeo 
(2017). 
24. Cragg, J. G. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application 
to the demand for durable goods. Econometrica 39, 829-844 (1971). 
25. Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M.  Problems with instrumental variables 
estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variable is weak. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 90, 443-450 (1995).  
26. Bouma, J., Reyes-García, V., Huanca, T., & Arrazola, S. Understanding conditions 
for co-management: A framed field experiment amongst the Tsimane, Bolivia. Ecol. 
Econ. 141, 32-42 (2017). 
27. Bowles, S., & Polania-Reyes, S. Economic incentives and social preferences: 
substitutes or complements? J. Econ. Lit. 50, 368-425 (2012). 
28. Bardhan, P. Decentralization of governance and development. J. Econ. Perspect. 16, 
185-205 (2002).  
24	
	
29. Andersson, K., & Agrawal, A. Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons. Glob. 
Environ. Change 21, 866-875 (2011). 
30. Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990). 
31. Baland, J-M., & Platteau, J-P Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a 
Role for Rural Communities? (FAO, Rome, 1996). 
32. Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources. 
(University of Michigan Press, 1994).  
33. Sally, D. Can I say “bobobo” and mean “There’s no such thing as cheap talk”. J. 
Econ. Beh. Org 57, 245-266 (2005). 
34. Souza, G. I. People, Parks, and Public Policies in the Twenty-First Century. Human 
Security and the Political Ecologies of the Brazilian Amazon. Reflections from the 
Mosaic of Protected Areas of the Lower River Negro, Amazonas. (London, King’s 
Brazil Institute. King’s College London. P.380, 2017). 
35. Ostrom, E. Collective action and the evolution of social norms’, J. Econ. Perspect. 
14, 137-158 (2000).  
36. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. Are people conditionally cooperative? 
Evidence from a Public Goods experiment. Econ. Letters 71, 397-404 (2001). 
37. Keser, C., & van Winden, F. Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to 
public goods. Scand. J. Econ. 102, 23-39 (2000). 
38. Gupta, S. K. Intention-to-treat concept: a review. Perspect. Clin. Res. 2, 109-112 
(2011). 
39. Battese, G. E. A note on the estimation of Cobb-Douglas production functions when 
some explanatory variables have zero values. J. Ag. Econ. 48, 250-252 (1997). 
40. QGIS Development Team. QGIS Geographic Information System. Open Source 





For helpful discussions and comments we thank: J. Bouma, B. Groom, E. Gsottbauer, A.  
Kontoleon, A-K Koessler, L. Lima, R. Lubowski, M. Malen, S. Roth, V. Salviatti, G. 
Shreedhar, V. Solidade; participants at the Sustainability and Development Conference 
(Michigan), BIOECON (Wageningen), plus research seminars at Cambridge University, 
Hamburg University and the LSE. We also thank our research assistants (A. Ferreira, C. 
França, T. Farias, A. de Carvalho, E. Mota, L. Barros, L. M. Ferreira, M. Leitão, R. J. da 
Costa) in the Institutional Links project ‘Participatory Approaches to Natural Resource 
Conservation in the Brazilian Amazon’, funded by the British Council (Newton Fund, grant 
reference: 261873660 (SSP-C577)). The Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS) provided 
further funding and logistical assistance. This article is dedicated to the memory of Tony 
Hall, who sadly passed away in May 2019. 
Author contributions 
A.H., V.V., and C.P. conceived the project, C.P and G.S. designed the experiment, 
household survey and interview questions, G.S., E. L., and C.P. conducted the experiments, 
G.S. and E.L. conducted the interviews, C.P. developed the analytical approach, analysed 















Fig. 1. Map showing location of communities sampled in RDS Rio Negro (treatment 
group) and RDS Puranga Conquista (control group), Amazonas State, Brazil  
Note: The background is satellite imagery, which shows the extent of forest cover in the study area. The map 
was constructed using QGIS 2.18 [40].  
 
 
Fig. 2. Average extraction rates per person: treatment vs control groups 
 
Note: Unit of analysis is individual-round. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals ±1.96 standard errors. Using a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test on whether the two groups have the same median extraction rate, we reject the null 
hypothesis of equal medians for rounds two (p=0.029) and three (p=0.028). Combining extraction rates from all 












(# CPR game 
players) 
Income projects in treated communities & stage of development 
(% of players in community receiving private benefits) 
Early Intermediate Advanced 
Camará  
(16) 
Animal husbandry (6) Fruit & veg production (6)  
Fishing & agriculture (6) 
Handicrafts (0) 
Restaurant (6)  
Tourist accommodation (0) 
Saracá  
(20) 
 Handicrafts (35) 
Fishing & agriculture (20) 
Tourist accommodation (15) 
Sport fishing (10) 
Fruit & veg production (5) 







Fruit & veg production (0) Animal husbandry (8) 
Handicrafts (4) 
Sport fishing (4) 
Bakery (4) 
Restaurant (0) 
Tourist accommodation (0) 
N. S. P. 
Socorro (36) 
Fishing & agriculture (11) 
Sport fishing (6) 
Restaurant (8) 
Fruit & veg production (6) 
Animal husbandry (3) 
Handicrafts (14) 
Tourist accommodation (6) 
Beekeeping (6) 
Carpentry (0) 
Rubber tapping (0) 
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Table 2. Reserve ITT and individual treatment effects on individual tree extraction 



























Coefficients from hurdle model. Unit of analysis is individual-round. The ‘Select’ panel shows results for the 
decision of whether to extract zero or a positive number of trees while the ‘Outcome’ panel shows results for the 
decision of how many trees to extract for players extracting a non-zero number of trees. Pre-treatment controls 
are age and gender. Post-treatment controls are education level, strength of kinship ties, pre-reserve 
membership of a community organisation, membership of a leadership directory, financial benefits received from 
Income activities and number of months enrolled in the Family component. All models include clustered standard 
errors. 










 Individual (0,1)	  -0.039	
P=0.858	
   

























 Individual (0,1)	  -0.416	
P=0.787	
   
















Pre-treatment controls	 N	 N	 N	 Y	 Y	
Post-treatment controls	 N	 N	 N	 N	 Y	
Pseudo R2	 0.015	 0.020	 0.022	 0.038	 0.086	





Table 3. Community ITT and individual treatment effects on individual tree extraction 




























Note: Coefficients from hurdle model. Unit of analysis is individual-round. The ‘Select’ panel shows results for the 
decision of whether to extract zero or a positive number of trees while the ‘Outcome’ panel shows results for the 
decision of how many trees to extract for players extracting a non-zero number of trees. ‘Round’ denotes a 
Dep. Var.: ALL extract	 1	 2	
Select	 Round	 -0.011 	 P=0.614	 -0.011 	 P=0.593	
 Community 4	 -0.997	 P<0.001	   
 Community 5	 -0.058	 P=0.759	   
 Community 6	 0.107	 P=0.599	   
 Community 7	 -0.854	 P<0.001	   
 Individual (1-2)	   0.085	 P=0.629	
 Individual (3-15)	   -0.371	 P=0.060	
 Constant	 -0.115	 P=0.208	 -0.308	 P=0.025	
Outcome	 Round	 0.332	 P=0.141	 0.307	 P=0.167	
 Community 4	 -1.424	 P=0.279	   
 Community 5	 -0.048	 P=0.969	   
 Community 6	 0.290	 P=0.667	   
 Community 7	 -1.251	 P=0.354	   
 Individual (1-2)	   0.276	 P=0.774	
 Individual (3-15)	   -0.395	 P=0.668	
 Constant	 7.158	 P<0.001	 7.038	 P<0.001	





dummy for round in the CPR game. Average participation rates in Income workshops per treated community: (4) 
0.7; (5) 2.9; (6) 1.4; (7) 1.9. Models include clustered standard errors. 
	
